[NU Sports] Basketball Coaches salaries

[Ivars Embrekts]

I think this had a lot to do with it. How much? A lot, but how much 
exactly is hard to say.

Excerpt...full link below...

Senator Paul S. Sarbanes 
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/paul_s_sarbanes/index.html?inline=nyt-per> 
when he rewrote the nation's corporate laws after a wave of accounting 
scandals. "Do we feel secure if there are these drops in capital we 
really will have investor protection?" Mr. Goldschmid asked. A senior 
staff member said the commission would hire the best minds, including 
people with strong quantitative skills to parse the banks' balance 
sheets. Annette L. Nazareth, the head of market regulation, reassured 
the commission that under the new rules, the companies for the first 
time could be restricted by the commission from excessively risky 
activity. She was later appointed a commissioner and served until 
January 2008. "I'm very happy to support it," said Commissioner Roel C. 
Campos, a former federal prosecutor and owner of a small radio 
broadcasting company from Houston, who then deadpanned: "And I keep my 
fingers crossed for the future."

The proceeding was sparsely attended. None of the major media outlets, 
including The New York Times, covered it. After 55 minutes of 
discussion, which can now be heard on the Web sites of the agency and 
The Times, the chairman, William H. Donaldson 
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/d/william_h_donaldson/index.html?inline=nyt-per>, 
a veteran Wall Street executive, called for a vote. It was unanimous. 
The decision, changing what was known as the net capital rule, was 
completed and published in The Federal Register a few months later.

With that, the five big independent investment firms were unleashed.

In loosening the capital rules, which are supposed to provide a buffer 
in turbulent times, the agency also decided to rely on the firms' own 
computer models for determining the riskiness of investments, 
essentially outsourcing the job of monitoring risk to the banks 
themselves. Over the following months and years, each of the firms would 
take advantage of the looser rules. At Bear Stearns, the leverage ratio 
--- a measurement of how much the firm was borrowing compared to its 
total assets --- rose sharply, to 33 to 1. In other words, for every 
dollar in equity, it had $33 of debt. The ratios at the other firms also 
rose significantly.

(snip)

The 2004 decision also reflected a faith that Wall Street's financial 
interests coincided with Washington's regulatory interests.

"We foolishly believed that the firms had a strong culture of 
self-preservation and responsibility and would have the discipline not 
to be excessively borrowing," said Professor James D. Cox, an expert on 
securities law and accounting at Duke School of Law (and no relationship 
to Christopher Cox).

"Letting the firms police themselves made sense to me because I didn't 
think the S.E.C. had the staff and wherewithal to impose its own 
standards and I foolishly thought the market would impose its own 
self-discipline. We've all learned a terrible lesson," he added.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03sec.html?_r=2&em=&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1223305538-uMZvMWSDEm2zTpzKWpH4ww&pagewanted=all